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Abstract
We develop a game-theoretical model to examine the implications of the introduction of
a non-prot public option in the U.S. health insurance market, in which a continuum of
heterogeneous consumers, each facing unknown medical expenditures and di¤ering in their ex-
pectations of such expenditures, have to choose between a prot-maximizing private insurance
plan and a social-welfare-maximizing public plan. We then estimate and calibrate the model
based on the U.S. data and quantify the Nash equilibrium of the market structure. Empirical
results suggest that private insurer will still represent a signicant part of the insurance market
and generate a substantially positive prot.
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1 Introduction
One of the most controversial issues in the recent debate over health care reform in the United States
is whether the reform should include a public option,i.e., a non-prot insurance plan managed by
the federal government that would compete with the private, for-prot insurance plans. Advocates
of the public option argue that a non-prot insurance plan, with lower administrative costs and
without protability pressure, will not only provide a less expensive option to the general public,
but will also discipline the private insurance companies because of the competition it brings to the
insurance market.
Opponents of the public option, on the other hand, warn that the public option may eventually
drive out the private insurers who cannot compete, and take over the whole insurance market. For
instance, in its comments submitted to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee on June 10, 2009, the
American Medical Association opposed the creation of the public option, stating that health services
should be provided through private markets, as they are currently,because the introduction of a
new public plan threatens to restrict patient choice by driving out private insurers, which currently
provide coverage for nearly 70 percent of Americans,and that the corresponding surge in public
plan participation would likely lead to an explosion of costs that would need to be absorbed by
taxpayers(New York Times, June 10, 2009).
How to reform the existing health care system is apparently one of the most important challenges
the United States faces, in particular at this moment when the health care expenditure is accounting
for more than 16% of the GDP while continuing to increase at a faster pace than the GDP itself,
and when the U.S. federal government is running an alarmingly high level of public debt. However,
despite the heated debate over the legitimacy and feasibility of the public option,there seems to
be a lack of rigorous economic and quantitative analysis of the consequences of introducing such
an option. For instance, the report by the Council of Economic Advisors published in 2009 (CEA
2009) mainly focuses on the impacts of overall medical reforms on long-run economic growth,
employment, and government decits, through international and states comparisons and under
hypothetical scenarios, but does not provide a model-based quantitative analysis of the market
equilibrium.
In this paper, we tackle this issue by examining the following questions: is it true that a
non-prot public option in the health insurance market would drive out the private insurers? If
not, what is the minimum market share of the public insurer that would allow attaining complete
market coverage while not sustaining a budget decit? We answer these two questions by rst
developing a theoretical model in a stochastic environment, in which a continuum of heterogeneous
consumers, each facing unknown medical expenditures, but di¤ering in their expectations of these
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expenditures, have to choose between two plans: one plan is o¤ered by a prot-maximizing private
insurance company, while the other by a public insurer that aims to maximize social welfare while
not sustaining a budget decit. We then estimate and calibrate the model and provide an empirical
characterization of the Nash equilibrium of the market structure.
The model is calibrated using empirical data on U.S. medical expenditures. In particular,
based on a data set from the U.S. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we rst estimate a Bayesian
hierarchical model to obtain the underlying distribution of expected medical expenditures, and
then numerically solve the model and calibrate the market equilibrium, adopting standard choices
of risk-preference parameter values and the estimated distribution of medical expenditures. Our
model suggests that the public plan will not drive out the private insurers from the market. This is
because the private insurers can skim the market by o¤ering higher deductibles and lower premiums
to attract the relatively healthier consumers, who do not expect high medical expenses but are
mandated to purchase an insurance policy. The public plan takes the residual part of the market,
having to demand higher premiums to cover the expected higher expenditures. In equilibrium, both
the private insurer and the public option stay in the market. Consequently, the private insurance
plan will still account for a signicant part of the insurance market with a substantially positive
prot. This suggests that the worries about a government takeover are unwarranted. We also nd
that relaxing the public plans zero prot constraint and allowing it to run at a limited decit will
increase the public plans market share, forcing the private plan to substantially lower its premiums
and prot, but the social welfare improves. A more cost-e¤ective public insurer, or an upper limit
on private insurers prot margin, will also lead to a decline in private insurers prot and to an
improvement of social welfare.
Traditionally, private entities have been the main suppliers of health insurance coverage for
working age individuals in the United States. However in a few instances, the federal or state
governments have intervened to improve the provision of health care to certain groups of patients.
As in the current policy debate over the universal health care, concerns from the private sector have
always arisen whenever the government enters the market as an alternative insurance provider, and
such concerns have promoted several previous empirical studies to try to quantify the potential
crowding out e¤ect of those government programs. Yet so far researchers have not been able to
reach a consensus. For instance, Cutler and Gruber (1996) estimate the e¤ect of the Medicaid
expansion to pregnant women and children on private insurance coverage, and conclude that on
average 50% of the individuals who were previously covered by private insurers have switched
to the new public program.1 Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004) obtain a similar estimate when
examining the implications of the Supplemental Childrens Health Insurance Program. An even
larger estimate is obtained by Brown and Finkelstein (2008), in which they study the Medicaids
1When revisited 10 years later, Gruber and Simon (2008) obtain an even higher estimate at 60%.
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crowding out e¤ect on long-term care private insurers, and conclude that even if the private insurers
choose to o¤er comprehensive policies at actuarially fair prices, the bottom two-thirds less wealthy
patients would still prefer Medicaid. On the other hand, some other studies such as Rask and Rask
(2000), Lo Sasso and Meyer (2010), and Ham and Shore-Shepard (2005) suggest that the crowding
out e¤ect of Medicaid on private insurance coverage may be very small or insignicant. A recent
study by Miller and Yeo (2011) examines the potential crowding out e¤ect in the Medicare Part D
prescription drug market, and suggests that if the government plan operates at the same cost as
the private insurers, it will have a negligible e¤ect on the market structure; however, a 25 percent
cost advantage would enable the government plan to capture one-fourth of the market.
In this paper, instead of focusing on some specic government programs that only target certain
groups of citizens as in previous studies, we analyze and quantify the market equilibrium in the
presence of a universal public health insurance plan for the whole U.S. population. Thus our study
provides an alternative and much more comprehensive answer to the question and has a direct
bearing on the relevant policy debates. Moreover, methodologically, most of the existing studies
have relied on a reduced-form or statistical approach, and our paper is the rst one that examines
the market equilibrium in a structural game-theoretical framework. Another novelty of our study
is the estimation of a Bayesian hierarchical model of a continuum of heterogeneous health types
or expected medical expenditures for the whole U.S. population. This captures the heterogeneity of
health conditions of individual consumers as well as the uncertainties that they face when purchasing
insurance policies, both of which are very important characteristics of consumers in the medical
insurance market in reality but have largely been ignored by existing studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model and
discusses the strategy to solve and calibrate the model. Section 3 estimates a Bayesian hierarchical
model to obtain the underlying distribution of expected medical expenditures. Section 4 calibrates
the model and presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Health Insurance Markets
Consumers are assumed to possess a constant absolute risk aversion utility function over nal wealth
u(x) =  e x, with coe¢ cient of risk aversion  > 0. Each consumer incurs health expenses over the
period covered by the policy that are distributed exponentially with parameter ; the corresponding
probability density function is f(t) = 1 e
  t
 for t 2 [0;1).2 Thus, the expected health expenses
2The exponential distribution, that we employ for its analytical tractability and versatility, is a particular case of
the Weibull distribution with shape parameter equal to 1. These distributions are employed in the literature to model
the health expenses distribution with a parametrized hazard function that describes the likelihood of any possible
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of an individual of type  are exactly . The expenditure type  is private information of each
consumer, and is thus unknown to the public or private insurers. The types are distributed in the
population with cumulative distribution function H() on [0;1), which will be estimated from the
data. All consumers are mandated to purchase medical insurance.
The private insurer o¤ers a policy characterized by two parameters (pp; dp), where pp is the
insurance premium and dp the deductible. A consumer insured by the private insurer will pay the
rst dp dollars of the realized health expenses, and the insurance plan will cover the rest. The
public insurer o¤ers an insurance policy (pg; dg) with a premium pg and deductible dg. In practice,
insurance contracts are dened by a larger number of provisions instead of only a premium and a
deductible.3 However, all these plan characteristics serve to describe the cost and various features
of a risk sharing mechanism between insurance companies and individuals, and for simplicity here
we use the deductible as a measure of the overall risk share allocated to the consumer. Finally,
in our model the public insurer must cover all consumers not covered by the private insurer, and
must not run a budget decit (although later on we will relax this non-negative prot constraint
and explore the market equilibrium with a limited decit level). The private insurer maximizes
expected prots, while the public insurer aims at maximizing the expected social welfare dened
as the sum of the consumer and the producer surpluses.
2.1 Consumers Problem
Consider two generic insurance plans characterized by the premium-deductible pairs (p1; d1) and
(p2; d2). Clearly, when pi > pj and di > dj , plan (pj ; dj) will dominate plan (pi; di) and all
consumers will select the former. In the following, we assume that d1 > d2 and p1 < p2. Denote by
	(d; ; ) 
8<: e
(  1 )d 1
 1 , when  6= 1
1 + d, when  = 1
(1)
The next proposition describes the choice of the individual of type  between the two contracts.
Proposition 1 Assume d1 > d2 and p1 < p2. Then, a consumer of type  will choose the plan
(p1; d1) if and only if
p2 +
1

ln 	(d2; ; )  p1 + 1

ln 	(d1; ; ) (2)
claim level. See Basu, Manning and Mullahy (2004) for an overview of these models.
3These provisions may include coinsurance rates, copayments, etc. In addition, current health insurance plans
may also specify annual or lifetime coverage limits. According to the new health care law, insurers are no longer
allowed to include coverage limits in the design of their plans. Finally, health insurance plans may specify covered
benets, drug formularies, exclusions, in-network providers, etc. Since these characteristics do not have clear nancial
implications, we do not include them in the model.
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Proof. See Appendix A1.
Thus, when choosing a plan (p; d), a consumer of type  trades o¤ the at up-front premium p,
with an indirect premium 1 ln 	(d; ; ), which is the certainty equivalent of the random prospect
induced by the cost sharing mechanism, i.e., by the deductible. 	(d; ; ) is clearly increasing in
the deductible d and, as shown in appendix A2, is also increasing in the coe¢ cient of risk aversion
 and in the type .
The next proposition describes the resulting separation of types among the two insurance plans.
Proposition 2 Assume d1 > d2 and p1 < p2. Then, there exists a cuto¤ (p1; d1; p2; d2) such that
a consumer of type  chooses plan (p1; d1) if and only if   (p1; d1; p2; d2).
Proof. See Appendix A3.
Thus, the healthier types, who expect low expenses, assign a lower probability to the event that
the deductible will be reached, and select the plan with the lower premium and higher deductible.
It can be shown that (p1; d1; p2; d2) is increasing in p2 and d2, and decreasing in p1 and d1; as
expected, an increase in either the premium or the deductible of an insurance plan will make that
plan less attractive, shrinking its market share.
2.2 InsurersProblems
For any possible combination of the private and public plan characteristics (pg; dg; pp; dp), denote the
set of consumers who choose the private and public plan by 
p (pg; dg; pp; dp) and 
g (pg; dg; pp; dp),
respectively. As elicited by Proposition 2, the insurer with the higher deductible and lower premium
will attract the healthier individuals. When, for instance, when pp < pg, the private plan captures
the healthier part of market and 
p (pg; dg; pp; dp) = f :    (pg; dg; pp; dp)g.
Now, given the public plans premium and deductible (pg; dg), the private insurers decision is
to choose pp and dp in order to maximize its prot P (pg; dg; pp; dp), dened as
P (pg; dg; pp; dp) =
Z

p(pg ;dg ;pp;dp)
 
pp  
Z 1
dp
t  dp

e
  t
 dt
!
dH() (3)
=
Z

p(pg ;dg ;pp;dp)

pp   e 
dp


dH()
On the other hand, given the private plans premium and deductible (pp; dp), the public insurers
problem is to choose pg and dg so as to maximize the social welfare SW (pg; dg; pp; dp), subject to
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a non-negative constraint on its prot G (pg; dg; pp; dp)  0, where
G (pg; dg; pp; dp) =
Z

g(pg ;dg ;pp;dp)

pg   e 
dg


dH() (4)
To construct the social welfare function, we rst compute the consumer surplus of an individual
of type  who purchases a generic insurance contract (p; d). For this, we compute the value of
the premium p0 that would make the individual indi¤erent between paying the premium p0 for a
contract with deductible d, and having no insurance at all. Then, the consumer surplus will be p0 p.
Since the value of the expected utility experienced by the individual with no insurance does not
depend on any of the choice variables (pg; dg; p; dp), and thus does not a¤ect the equilibrium game
play between the two insurers, we forgo computing it and instead denote it by U0 (). Therefore,
p0 will be the solution to the equation:Z d
0
u (w   p0   t) f(t)dt+
Z 1
d
u (w   p0   d) f(t)dt = U0 ()
Solving it, we obtain:
p0 +
1

ln 	(d; ; ) = w +
1

lnU0 ()
Therefore,
CS(; p; d) = p0   p
= A()  1

ln 	(d; ; )  p (5)
where A() is a function that does not depend on p or d. On the other hand, the expected prot
that the seller of an insurance contract (p; d) would make on an individual of type  is
PS(; p; d) = p 
Z 1
d
t  d

e
  t
 dt = p  e  d (6)
Thus, from (5) and (6) it follows that:
SW (pg; dg; pp; dp) = A 
Z

p(pg ;dg ;pp;dp)

1

ln 	(dp; ; ) + e
  d


dH() (7)
 
Z

g(pg ;dg ;pp;dp)

1

ln 	(dg; ; ) + e
  dg


dH()
where A is a constant. Note that SW (pg; dg; pp; dp) does not depend directly on the two premiums
pp and pg since they represent transfers from the consumers to the insurers that do not a¤ect the
social welfare. However, the two premiums a¤ect social welfare through their e¤ects on the market
share of the two insurers, as elicited by  (pg; dg; pp; dp). On the other hand, the two deductibles
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also a¤ect social welfare directly through their e¤ects on the consumer and producer surpluses
associated with each type . This is because a higher deductible reduces the consumer surplus, as
the individual bears more of the risk, and increases the insurers prot by reducing its expected
costs. We assume that the public and private insurers compete over market share by adjusting
premiums and deductibles, and we solve the model and characterize the Nash equilibrium of the
market in the empirical sections below.
So far, we have assumed that the public option competes against a single monopolistic private
insurer. Although the presence of the public insurer does induce some degree of competition in
the market, the public insurer aims at maximizing social welfare instead of prot, and the private
insurer is thus the only prot-maximizing player in the market. In reality, while the health insurance
market does exhibit a signicant and increasing degree of concentration and monopoly power, the
market is not perfectly monopolistic.4 To acknowledge this in a manageable way under our model
framework, we simulate an alternative scenario in which the private insurer is constrained by a
maximum prot margin  over actuarial cost, corresponding to the case where several monopolistic
competitors in the private segment of the insurance market compete with each other and bid down
their average prot margin. The parameter  will be a measure of the competitiveness of the
market, and will be one of the key variables in the comparative statics analysis.
In the later simulation analysis, we will also investigate claims that the public option may
either have a stronger bargaining power with health care providers and is thus more cost e¤ective,
or alternatively, that a lack of e¢ ciency may actually lead to higher administrative costs of the
public plan. Both of these claims have been frequently argued by both sides of the health care reform
debate. We proceed by introducing an additional parameter, , to measure the cost e¤ectiveness
of the public insurer. When  = 1, the public plan is running with the same e¢ ciency as the
private plan, and the costs the public insurer faces are identical to the actual medical expenditures
as drawn from the exponential distribution by individual patients.  < 1 corresponds to the case
that the public plan is more cost e¤ective and can thus cover the patients at a discounted rate, and
 > 1 refers to the opposite case when the public insurer faces a higher operating and management
cost. The private insurer always faces the same costs as the patients actually incur (i.e., as drawn
from the exponential distribution).
The stylized model that we have constructed makes several strong albeit very interesting as-
sumptions. First, we assume that everyone is required by law to purchase medical insurance, i.e.,
an individual mandate, an assumption not satised in the current U.S. legislation, but that
has been signed into law (Patient Protection and A¤ordable Care Actof March 23, 2010) and
4Dafny (2010) elicits the presence of market power in most insurance markets by identifying increases in premiums
for employer-sponsored plans following a positive protability shock to an employer.
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will take e¤ect in 2014.5 Secondly, we assume that individuals purchase medical insurance by
themselves, whereas in the U.S., most non-elderly people purchase medical insurance through their
employer-sponsored plans, i.e., through a two-tier decision making process in which the employers
rst negotiate with insurance companies and choose several plans to sponsor, and then employees
make their purchase decisions within the limited set of the chosen plans, or opt out.6 However, in
our model there are only two insurers, and we thus assume that individuals will make their choice
entirely by themselves. Moreover, whether employer-based health insurance should continue to be
the format going forward is again up for debate (Reinhardt 2009), and our simulation study based
on this assumption is still very relevant. Finally, for simplicity we assume that individuals have
the same level of risk aversion and are homogenous on all dimensions of their economic and social
status except for their health conditions. This is a useful and very standard assumption in the
literature, yet we should still note that the quantitative results of our simulation study in Section
4 need to be interpreted with caution.
3 Estimation of the Underlying Distribution of Expected Medical
expenditures
To examine the empirical characteristics of market equilibrium as implied by the model, we need
to obtain a realistic calibration of the underlying distribution H () of the expected medical expen-
ditures i for the U.S. consumers. This is because when purchasing medical insurance, consumers
are unable to observe the actual medical expenditures in the future. Rather, they have to make
their decisions based on the probabilistic distributions of the actual medical expenses that they may
incur over the following year. Therefore, they face uncertainty when making purchasing decisions,
even with the private knowledge of their own medical typesi:
Most of the existing studies in the literature, however, have been concentrated on analyzing a
group of consumersactual medical expenditures, for instance, by regressing the actual expenditures
on various observable characteristics of the consumers in a given sample, such as age, gender, and
income. Such a methodology can generate a model-based prediction of the actual expenses, i.e., a
xed number for each individual, conditional on the observed consumer characteristics. However,
5The legislation is currently being widely challenged in federal courts as unconstitutional,and the U.S. Supreme
Court is expected to rule on the case soon.
6According to a survey conducted by Kaiser Family Foundation (2010), individual, or non-group, health insurance
covers about 14 million nonelderly people in the U.S., making it the least common source of health insurance. In
contrast, about 157 million nonelderly people are covered by employer-sponsored insurance.
9
it is unable to capture the uncertainty or the probabilistic distribution that each individual faces
when making purchasing decisions, and is only able to provide a group of di¤erent predicted values
for a given set of consumers, rather than the distribution of a continuum of heterogeneous types
or expectations of medical expenditures for the whole U.S. population. We thus decide to take
a more structural approach and estimate a Bayesian hierarchical model of conjugate likelihood
distribution of the expected medical expenditures, details to be explained later.
We estimate this distribution using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS),
which is the most comprehensive survey on medical service of the U.S. households, their medical
providers, and employers. The Household Component of the MEPS collects detailed data from a
sample of families and individuals in selected communities across the U.S., including information
such as demographic characteristics, health conditions, use of medical services, charges and source
of payments, etc.
For our purpose, we extract the medical expenses incurred by all individuals included in the
database and estimate the underlying distribution of expected medical expenditures for the U.S.
consumers. We use the data from the year of 2007, the latest year for which the MEPS had
expenditure data on when we estimated the distribution. Among the 30; 964 individuals, we focus
on the ones that are of age 64 and under, since those of age 65 and above are covered by the U.S.
Medicare program, and are thus not the focus of the current medical policy debates or our study.
Therefore our estimation sample consists of 27; 238 individuals of age 64 and under in the U.S., with
35% are under the age of 18, 23% are between 18 and 34, 25% between 35 and 50, and 17% between
51 and 64. The mean medical expenditure in 2007 was $2; 600, and the median $434. Figure 1
shows the empirical histogram of the observed medical expenditures, which is heavily skewed to
the right.
Since the MEPS only reports the actual or ex-post expenditures of the survey respondents but
not their ex-ante expectations of medical expenditures, we need to infer the distribution of the lat-
ter from the observations of the former with the help of some statistical modeling. Because of this
hierarchical structure, we estimate a Bayesian hierarchical model of conjugate likelihood distribu-
tions (George, Makov and Smith, 1993) to uncover the distribution of the individuals expectations
of their own medical expenditures, i, whose cumulative distribution function is denoted as H()
as in Section 2.
We assume that i follows the conjugate likelihood prior distribution of a negative exponential
distribution, i.e., an Inverse Gamma distribution of parameters  and , which is also a highly
skewed distribution to the right, similar to the histogram of the realized medical expenditures in
Figure 1. Thus, conditional on  and , the individual parameter distributions i are independent
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and identically distributed as:
s(ij; ) =

  ()
  1i e
  
i for i  0 (8)
For  and  , rather than treating both of them as xed as in Gaver & OMuircheartaigh (1987),
we proceed by conducting a Bayesian estimation, similar to the strategy in Gelfand and Smith
(1990). In particular, we put a Gamma prior on  in the form of s() = k1 1 exp( =k2), i.e.,
a Gamma distribution with parameters (k1; k2), and estimate the distribution of  using Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method in a Gibbs Sampling algorithm.  will be estimated using a
Method of Moment estimator in each round of Gibbs sampling.7
Conditional on  and , from (8) and the underlying assumption of exponentially distributed
individual heath expenses, (i.e., s(tiji; ; ) = 1i e
  ti
i ), it follows that the posterior for i upon
observing the individual is health expenses ti is:
s(ijti; ; ) =
s(i; tij; )
s(tij; ) =
s(tiji; ; )s(ij; )
s(tij; )
and
s(ijti; ; ) /

1
i
e
  ti
i

  1i e
  
i

=   2i e
 +ti
i
Therefore, the posterior distribution of i, s(ijti; ; ), is an Inverse Gamma distribution with
parameters + 1 and  + ti.
Since the likelihood function of an Inverse Gamma distribution is:
L (j; 1; :::; n) /


  ()
n  Qn
i=1 
 1
i
+1
e 
Pn
i=1
 1i (9)
the posterior of  given  and 1; :::; n is of the form:
s (j; 1; :::; n) / L (j; 1; :::; n) s() (10)
Furthermore, we can derive the posteriors for  as
s(j; 1; :::; n) / ne 
Pn
i=1
 1i s () (11)
Thus the posterior distribution for , s (j; 1; :::; n), is indeed a Gamma distribution with pa-
rameters n+ k1 and (
Pn
i=1 
 1
i + k
 1
2 )
 1.
7We have also experimented a full-scale Bayesian estimation by putting an exponential prior on  as well. The
posterior probability density function of  turns out to be quite complicated and is not a known distribution, and
cannot be directly simulated. Thus an Adaptive Rejection Sampling (ARS) algorithm is adopted to numerically draw
 in each round of the MCMC. Unfortunately, the ARS algorithm is very time-consuming, and the MCMC converges
quite slowly and the results are not very stable. Therefore, we nally chose to estimate  using a Method of Moment
estimator.
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With the analytical posterior distributions of i and  derived above, we are now ready to
estimate the distribution H () using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method in a Gibbs
Sampling algorithm. The parameters of the Bayesian hierarchical model to be estimated are  and
. To obtain the joint posterior distribution of (; ), we simulate 100; 000 iterations of the Gibbs
samplers, with the rst 99; 000 observations as the initial burn-in period, and report the inferences
of the last 1; 000 random draws of the joint posterior distribution of  and : For robustness we start
with four di¤erent prior distributions of , s() = Gamma(1; 0:1); s() = Gamma(1; 1); s() =
Gamma(0:1; 1), and s() = Gamma(0:1; 100).
In particular, for each Bayesian prior, the following steps are conducted:
1). Upon observing the actual health expense ftigni=1, we draw the posterior figIi=1 from an
Inverse Gamma distribution (+ 1;  + ti);
2). Conditional on the simulated figIi=1 and  obtained from last round, draw the posterior 
from a Gamma distribution (n+ k1; [
Pn
i=1 
 1
i + k
 1
2 ]
 1);
3). Estimate  using a method-of-moments empirical Bayes argument based on E(i) = =( 
1) Pni=1 i=n:
And then we go back to the step 1 and iterate the Gibbs sampler for 100; 000 times.
The MCMC converges very quickly, within the rst few thousands of Bayesian draws. Table 1
presents the median and 95% error bands of the marginal distributions of  and  for each of the
four priors. As displayed in the table, the nal convergence points of the four di¤erent priors are
very close, and the error bands are quite tight around the median estimates, both supporting the
accuracy of the MCMC estimation. Thus the following empirical calibration of market equilibrium
will be based on the median estimates of  and  as reported.
Figure 2 displays the probability density function of the estimated posterior distribution of
i, with expenses normalized to units of $1; 000 in model estimation and simulation. It can be
immediately seen that the estimated Inverse Gamma distribution of i tsthe observed frequency
of realized expenditures ti in Figure 1 reasonably well, and that the parameter estimates are very
similar across the four di¤erent priors. For instance, the mean of the posterior distribution of i
under prior 1 is $2; 585, compared with the mean of the actual medical expenditure of $2; 600.
However, one shall note that ti is not the same as i, but rather the realization of some random
variable which follows an exponential distribution with a mean of i.
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4 Empirical Results
Based on the estimated posterior distribution of expected medical expenditures, we then solve
the model for the market equilibrium. We use the NIRA (Nikaido-Isoda/Relaxation Algorithm)
as developed by Krawczyk and Zuccollo (2006) to numerically solve for a Nash Equilibrium over
possible combinations of (pg; dg; pp; dp) in the parameter space, in which the two players, the private
insurer and the public insurer, choose their optimal strategies (pp; dp) and (pg; dg) independently,
with the goal of maximizing private prot and social welfare in equations (3) and (7), respectively.
With a starting point, the NIRA algorithm conducts an iterative search process for a xed point
that represents a Nash Equilibrium, and the process converges when the xed point is obtained.8
We begin our numerical search at di¤erent starting points of (pg; dg; pp; dp), and once the NIRA
algorithm converges and a convergence point is obtained, we conduct a grid search around it, in
order to make sure that the convergence point represents the best responses for each insurer, given
the other insurers strategy as reected in the convergence point. Through this procedure, we can
verify that the convergence point is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, when selecting the starting points of (pg; dg; pp; dp), we use points that are
evenly sparsed in the parameter space, and conduct the NIRA numerical algorithm from each of
these points. Most starting points lead to non-convergence or converge to unreasonable solutions
such as negative premiums or deductibles going to innity, and are thus eliminated. The starting
points that lead to convergence to a reasonable solution determine the same Nash Equilibrium for
a given specication of the parameters of the model. These ensure the uniqueness of the obtained
Nash equilibrium..
The model is highly non-linear and involves integrals without analytical solutions in several
equations. Therefore, when solving the model and calculating each players payo¤s, a numerical
quadrature algorithm is adopted to numerically integrate equations (3) and (7).9 We also employ
8The NIRA procedure is based on the observation that the problem of nding the xed point of a correspondence
is equivalent to that of maximizing a properly dened induced function. Thus, using the standard notation from a
normal form game of a player is strategy by si 2 Si, and of the resulting payo¤s ui : S! R by ui(s), one denes
the Nikaido-Isoda function 	 : S S ! R by 	(s0; s)  Pni=1 [ui(s0i; s i)  ui(si; s i)]. It is straightforward to see
that 	(s; s) = 0 and that 	0(s)  max
s02S
	(s0; s)  0 for all s 2 S. Moreover, s is a Nash equilibrium of the game if
and only if 	0(s) = 0. When the set of available actions for a player is endogenously dened by the actions of the
other players according to some constraint function, the Nikaido-Isoda function is dened in terms of the resulting
Lagrangian that includes the constraint function. For more details, see Krawczyk and Zuccollo (2006).
9To ensure the accuracy of numerical integration, we adopt a composite trapezoidal quadrature rule and divide
the integral interval at a very rened level, for instance, when calculating an insurers prot over (0; ), the interval
is divided into 1; 000 sub-intervals; when calculating an integral over (;1); the integral is rst transformed into a
nite interval (0; 1), and the numerical quadrature is then conducted.
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a non-linear equation solver to numerically solve for  (pg; dg; pp; dp), the cut-o¤ type between
choosing public and private insurance plans for all possible (pg; dg; pp; dp). Details of our numerical
methodology are available upon requests.
We rst calibrate the value of the CARA risk preference parameter  to the value estimated by
Cohen and Einav (1997) of 110 3, but we also experiment with higher values of , as the literature,
in particular macroeconomic literature, has generally calibrated with, or obtained through estima-
tion, some higher values for the risk aversion parameter. Based on the posterior estimates of  and
, we nd the Nash Equilibrium as described above, and report in Table 2 the market equilibrium
, the cut-o¤ type between choosing public and private insurance plans. The implied private and
public insurerspremium, deductible, and market share are also reported in the table. The results
corresponding to di¤erent calibration values for the risk aversion parameter  are reported in the
same table.
Calibration results conrm that private insurer will still be able to capture a signicant part
of the insurance market. As suggested by (7), because the public insurer maximizes social welfare
instead of its prot, it is indi¤erent between capturing the healthier or the less healthy individuals
as long as the budget constraint is satised. Thus, at Nash equilibrium, the private insurer will
always choose to o¤er a lower premium and capture the healthier part of market, generating a
positive prot. The less healthy consumers will enroll in the public plan, paying a higher premium
but enjoying a low deductible.
For instance, when  is set to 110 3, the market equilibrium is characterized by a private plan
charging a premium of $3; 228 and a deductible of $548, along with a public plan with a higher
premium of $3; 535 and an almost zero deductible. Even though with a higher premium, the public
plan is still more attractive for consumers with an expected expenditure more than $385, accounting
for 66% of the population. Covering these relatively less healthy consumers at such premium and
deductible generate zero prot for the public insurer, i.e., no scal burden for the government. In
contrast, a lower premium combined with a higher deductible makes the private insurance plan
more attractive to healthier consumers, as they expect to incur less medical expenditures during
the year, and thus would prefer a plan with lower premium despite the higher deductible. The
private plan will cover 34% of the whole population, generating a positive prot of $1; 082.
If the CARA parameter  is set at 2  10 3, corresponding to the case when consumers are
less willing to take the chance to bet on a low medical expense during the year, more consumers
will choose the public plan, as the cut-o¤  declines from $385 to $366 (column 2 of Table 2), and
the market share of the private plan shrinks from 34% to 32%. With a higher market share, the
public insurer is able to o¤er a lower premium, at $3; 440. This is because the increased market
share, i.e., those expecting an expenditure from $366 to $385, is composed of consumers who are
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healthier than the public insurers existing pool of consumers in column 1 of Table 2, and therefore
the public insurer is able to lower the premium and still run a balanced budget. Accordingly, with
a smaller market share and a lower premium, the private prot declines from $1; 082 to $987. As we
increased the CARA parameter, the public plans market share will continue to rise. For instance,
as shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, when the CARA parameter  is calibrated to 5  10 3 and
10  10 3, the public plans market share will increase to 73% and 80%, respectively.
Next we explore how the market equilibrium may change if the non-negative prot constraint
imposed on the public insurance plan is relaxed. In particular, we assume that, instead of having
to run a non-negative prot, the public insurer is now allowed to run a loss, with the maximum
amount of $250, i.e., now the government needs to subsidize the public insurance plan at no more
than $250 per capita, which would amount to a maximal annual loss of $75 billion for the whole
U.S. population of 301 million in 2007, or less than 2:7% of the U.S. federal expenditures in the
same year.
Simulation results as reported in Table 3 suggest that, when the non-negative prot constraint
is relaxed, the public insurer can substantially lower its premium, thus capturing a higher market
share. Moreover, facing a lower public premium, the private insurer will also have to lower its
premium and deductible, eventually leading to a social welfare improvement. For instance, in
column 1 of Table 3 where the risk-preference parameter  is set to 1  10 3, the public plan is
charging a premium of $2; 958, $577 lower than in the same column of Table 2 when a non-negative
prot constraint is imposed. The private plan responds by substantially cutting its premium and
deductible as well, by $534 and $53, respectively. At equilibrium, the market share of the public
insurer increases from 66% to 71%. The private insurers prot declines signicantly as well, from
$1; 082 to $769. Social welfare improved from lower deductibles and an expansion of the public
plan.
When the CARA parameter  is set to higher levels, the public plan is capturing an even higher
market share, as shown in columns 2 to 4 and explained above. On the other hand, compared
with the equilibrium under a non-negative prot constraint in Table 2, both the public and private
insurers are charging substantially lower premiums  indeed the reductions in both public and
private premiums substantially exceed the maximal scal subsidy provided by the government of
$250 per consumer. Both plans run at lower prots, yet the social welfare and consumer welfare
improve.
How shall we compare the lower protability and high premiums of the public plan with the
high protability and lower premiums of the private plan? Notice that up till now, we have assumed
that both private and public insurance plans have the same management e¢ ciency and operating
costs, and the only reason why the public plan generates a lower prot at equilibrium is that, as
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a social welfare maximizer, the public insurer is providing insurance to the less healthy group of
consumers, yielding the healthier, more protable segment of the market to the private insurer,
which turns out to run a substantial positive prot. On the other hand, as shown in Table 2, the
public plan does not necessarily run on a loss. Yet providing scal subsidy to a limited extent will
enable both the public and private insurers to substantially lower their premiums  even larger
than the amount of scal subsidy the government provides  and improve social welfare.
A more cost-e¤ective public insurer will drive both the public and private premiums down,
and increase its market share, as shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. For instance, when the
risk-preference parameter  is set to 1  10 3, a public plan that is 5% more cost e¤ective than
before will be able to lower premium by approximately $380 and still run on a balanced budget,
and occupy a larger market share of 71%, 5 percentage points higher than in our benchmark case
in Table 2. Facing more competitive pressure from the public insurer, the private insurer will again
be forced to lower its premium, from $3; 223 to $2; 876, and its prot shrinks from $1; 082 to $830.
Social welfare improves, as now the public plan with lower deductible has a higher market share.
Simulation based on a higher value of the CARA parameter generates qualitatively similar results.
On the other hand, if the public plan becomes less competitive than the private plan, for instance
due to a lack of e¢ ciency and higher administrative costs, then both the public premium and private
premium will increase, and public plans market share, because it becomes less competitive, tends
to decline. As shown in column 3 of Table 4, when the risk-preference parameter  is set to 110 3,
a public plan 5% less cost e¤ective than private plan will have to increase its premium to avoid a
prot loss, from $3; 535 in Table 2 to $3; 914, and the cut-o¤  rises from $385 to $421, implying a
signicantly smaller market share of 62%, compared at the 73% in Table 2. Facing a less competitive
public insurer, the private insurer can now increase its premium yet still occupying a larger market
share, and its prot rises from $1; 082 to $1; 335. Social welfare declines as more consumers are
now paying the higher private deductibles.
Finally, we investigate the scenarios in which the private segment of the insurance market faces
more intense internal competition and thus the average private prot rate is lower. In particular, we
impose a restriction that the private insurers prot margin  cannot exceed half of its equilibrium
level in our benchmark case in Table 2. With this upper limit on the prot margin, the private
insurer will substantially lower its deductible, by more than 50%, as shown in Table 5. Facing
the enhanced competition, the public plan responds by lowering its premium, and at equilibrium
its market share will slightly increase, by one to two percentage points. This is because, if at the
equilibrium the public plan only lowers its premium to the extent that ensures the same market
share as before, it will run a prot loss. Bounded by a zero-prot constraint, the public insurer will
now be forced to lower its premium further, by more than enough to maintain the same market
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share as before, and ends with a slightly higher market share. With the upper limit over its prot
margin, the private insurer has to run at a lower prot, yet social welfare improves signicantly
(Table 5).
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a stochastic game-theoretical model to analyze the consumers behavior in
choosing between a private medical insurance plan and a public insurance plan, with the former
a prot-maximizer and the latter a social-welfare-maximizer who faces di¤erent prot constraints.
The model is calibrated based on the data on medical expenditure from the U.S. Medical Expen-
diture Panel Survey and estimation of a Bayesian hierarchical model using a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) method. The Nash Equilibrium is solved using a numerical algorithm.
Calibration results reveal that the private insurer will not be completely driven out of the
insurance market, and will still capture a signicant part of the market. Moreover, at equilibrium,
the public insurer will choose to cover the less healthy group of consumers, leaving the healthier,
more protable section of the market to the private insurer. Consequently, the private insurance
plan generates a substantially positive prot, and the public plan runs at a balanced budget. When
the risk-aversion coe¢ cient is set to higher levels, the public plans market share will rise, the public
and private insurance premiums will decline, and private prot will fall. We also nd that when the
non-negative prot constraint imposed on the public plan is relaxed, both the public and private
insurance insurers will substantially lower their premiums, and the social welfare improves. A more
cost-e¤ective public insurer, or an upper limit on private insurers prot margin, will both lead to
a decline in private insurers prot and to an improvement of social welfare.
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Appendix A1. Proof of Proposition 1
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When  6= 1 , equation (12) can be written as ep2 e
(  1 )d2 1
 1  ep1 e
(  1 )d1 1
 1 . When  =
1
 ,
(12) becomes ep2 (1 + d2)  ep1 (1 + d1). Using the denition of 	(d; ; ) from (1), these can
be written concisely as ep2	(d2; ; )  ep1	(d1; ; ), and this completes the proof. 
Appendix A2.
We will show that 	(d; ; ) is increasing in  and . Denote by b (; )  e( )d   and note that
	(d; ; ) = b( 1 ; ). We rst show that
@
@b(; ) < 0 for  2 [0;1)n fg. This would then imme-
diately imply that @@	(d; ; ) =   12 @@b( 1 ; ) > 0. Thus, @@b(; ) =  de
( )d( )+e( )d 
( )2 ,
for  6= . Therefore, when  6= , we have
@
@
b(; ) < 0() de( )d (   ) > e( )d   1 (13)
Dene B1()  e( )d and note that B01()  de( )d > 0 and B001 ()  d2e( )d > 0. Thus,
B1 is increasing and strictly convex. Consider now some  < , and note that we can rewrite
(13) as de( )d > e
( )d 1
  , that is: B
0
1() >
B1() B1()
  . Since B1 is convex and  > , this
condition is satised. On the other hand, for  > , we rewrite (13) as de( )d < 1 e
( )d
  , that
is: B01() <
B1() B1()
  . Since B1 is convex and  < , this condition is again satised. Therefore,
@
@b(; ) < 0 as desired.
Next, we show that @@ b(; ) > 0 for  2 [0;1)n fg, which would imply immediately @@	(d; ; ) >
0. We have @@ b(; ) =
e( )d(1+d)( ) [e( )d ]
( )2 , for  6= . Denote by B2()  e( )d and
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note that @@ b(; ) > 0 if and only if B
0
2() >
B2() B2()
  . Since B
0
2()  (1 + d) e( )d > 0 and
B001 () 
 
2d+ d2

e( )d > 0, the result follows using the same argument as for @@b(; ). 
Appendix A3. Proof of Proposition 2
By Proposition 1, a consumer of type  will chose the insurance plan (p1; d1) if an only if e(p2 p1) 
k(; d1; d2) where when
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)
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Note that lim
! 1

k(; d1; d2) = k(
1
 ; d1; d2), so k (; d1; d2) is continuous at 1 , and thus everywhere.
Next, we will show that @@k(; d1; d2) > 0 for  2 [0;1)n

1

	
. This would complete the ar-
gument because it would imply that the condition e(p2 p1)  k(; d1; d2) is satised for all the
  (p1; d1; p2; d2) where (p1; d1; p2; d2) is dened implicitly by e(p2 p1) = k(; d1; d2).
Denote by
k1(z; 1; 2) =
(
e(1 z)1 z
e(1 z)2 z , when z 6= 1
1+1
1+2
, when z = 1
and note that k(; d1; d2) = k1( 1 ; d1; d2). Thus, to show
@
@k(; d1; d2) > 0, when d1 > d2 > 0,
it is enough to show that @@zk1(z; 1; 2) < 0, when z > 0 and 1 > 2 > 0. The arguments are
di¤erent for the cases when z < 1 and z > 1, and so we will consider the two cases separately.
Lemma 3 @@zk1(z; 1; 2) < 0 for z > 1 and 1 > 2 > 0.
Proof. We have
@
@z
k1(z; 1; 2) =

1 + 1e
(1 z)1 z   e(1 z)2  1 + 2e(1 z)2 z   e(1 z)1
e(1 z)2   z2
so it is enough to show that G(1) < 0 for 1 > 2 > 0 where
G(1) 
h
1 + 1e
(1 z)1
i h
z   e(1 z)2
i
 
h
1 + 2e
(1 z)2
i h
z   e(1 z)1
i
is a function of 1. Since G(1)j1=2 = 0, it is enough to show that G0(1) < 0 for 1 > 2.
Now, G0(1) = z (1  z) e(1 z)1 + e(1 z)1   e(1 z)(1+2)   (1  z) (1   2) e(1 z)(1+2), so to
show G0(1) < 0, it is enough to show that
e(z 1)2 [1  z (z   1)1] < 1  (1   2) (z   1) (15)
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Denote by LHS (z) and RHS (z) the left and right hand sides of (15) as functions of z and note
that LHS (1) = RHS (1) = 1 so it is enough to show that LHS0 (z) < RHS0 (z) for z > 1. Now,
RHS0 (z) = 2   1
LHS0(z) = 2e(z 1)2 [1  z (z   1)1] + e(z 1)2 [ 2z + 1]1
Note that LHS0 (1) = RHS0 (1) = 2   1 so to prove that LHS0 (z) < RHS0 (z) for z > 1, it is
enough to show that LHS00 (z) < RHS00 (z) for z > 1. We have
RHS00 (z) = 0
LHS00(z) = 22e
(z 1)2 [1  z (z   1)1] + 2e(z 1)2 [ 2z + 1]1 + 2e(z 1)2 [ 2z + 1]1   2e(z 1)21
=
h
22e
(z 1)2   2ze(z 1)21
i
+h
 22e(z 1)2z (z   1)1 + 2e(z 1)2 [ z + 1]1 + 2e(z 1)2 [ 2z + 1]1   2e(z 1)21
i
Note that 22e
(z 1)2   2ze(z 1)21 < 0 because z > 1 and 2 < 1. The rest of the terms in
LHS00(z) are all negative since z > 1 and therefore LHS00(z) < 0 = RHS00(z). This completes the
proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 4 @@zk1(z; 1; 2) < 0 for 0 < z < 1 and 1 > 2 > 0.
Proof. With a change of variable y =  z, we can rewrite k1(z; 1; 2) as k2( z) where
k2(y)  e
(1+y)1 + y
e(1+y)2 + y
so it is enough to show that k02(y) > 0 for y 2 ( 1; 0). Now,
k02(y) =

1e
(1+y)1 + 1
 
e(1+y)2 + y
  2e(1+y)2 + 1 e(1+y)1 + y
e(1+y)2 + y
2
so it is enough to show that J(y) > 0 for y 2 ( 1; 0) where
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i h
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= (1   2) e(1+y)(1+2) + y1e(1+y)1   y2e(1+y)2 + e(1+y)2   e(1+y)1
J( 1) = 0, so it is enough to show that J 0(y) > 0 for y 2 ( 1; 0). But J 0(y) =  21   22 e(1+y)(1+2)+
y21e
(1+y)1   y22e(1+y)2 . By writing J 0(y) as a function of 1, we denote by
I (1)  J 0(y) =
 
21   22

e(1+y)(1+2) + y21e
(1+y)1   y22e(1+y)2
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Note that I (1)j1=2 = 0, so it is enough to show that I 0 (1) > 0 for 1 > 2. But I 0 (1) =
21e
(1+y)(1+2)+
 
21   22

(1 + y) e(1+y)(1+2)+2y1e
(1+y)1+y (1 + y)21e
(1+y)1 , so it is enough
to show that 
21 +
 
21   22

(1 + y)

e(1+y)2 > ( y) 21 + (1 + y)21 (16)
Denote by LHS(y) and RHS(y) the left and right hand sides of (16) and note that LHS( 1) =
RHS( 1) = 21. Therefore, to prove the inequality, it is enough to show that LHS0(y) > RHS0(y)
for y 2 ( 1; 0). Now, LHS0(y) = 212   22 +  21   22 (1 + y)2 + 21 e(1+y)2 and RHS0(y) =
 21   (2y + 1)21. Note that, 212 > 22 because 1 > 2,
 
21   22

(1 + y)2 > 0 because
1 + y > 0, 21 >   (2y + 1)21 because y 2 ( 1; 0) and e(1+y)2 > 1 because 1 + y > 0. Therefore,
indeed LHS0(y) > RHS0(y) for y 2 ( 1; 0) which completes the proof of the lemma. 
This completes the proof of proposition 2. 
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Table 1: Posterior Distribution of i
Prior 1 Prior 2 Prior 3 Prior 4

Median 1.1956 1.1944 1.1949 1.1954
95% band (1.1778,1.2063) (1.1772,1.2066) (1.1780,1.2052) (1.1802,1.2066)

Median 0.5056 0.5032 0.5044 0.5055
95% band (0.4917,0.5186) (0.4893,0.5178) (0.4904,0.5170) (0.4926,0.5193)
23
Table 2: Nash Equilibrium with A Non-negative Public Prot Constraint
 = 1  10 3  = 2  10 3  = 5  10 3  = 10  10 3
Public Plan
Premium $3,535 $3,440 $3,234 $2,988
Deductible $4 $3 $15 $1
Prot $0 $0 $0 $0
Private Plan
Premium $3,228 $3,133 $2,937 $2,613
Deductible $548 $520 $465 $525
Prot $1,082 $987 $792 $527
Market Share
  1000 $385 $366 $326 $269
Public Share 65.9% 68.0% 72.5% 79.5%
Private Share 34.1% 32.0% 27.5% 20.5%
Social Welfare -$2,419.7 -$2,423.4 -$2,430.4 -$2,441.6
24
Table 3: Nash Equilibrium with a Maximal Public Loss of $250
 = 1  10 3  = 2  10 3  = 5  10 3  = 10  10 3
Public Plan
Premium $2,958 $2,900 $2,755 $2,274
Deductible $6 $3 $6 $5
Prot -$250 $-250 -$250 -$249
Private Plan
Premium $2,689 $2,625 $2,473 $2,020
Deductible $495 $482 $445 $483
Prot $769 $708 $563 $102
Market Share
  1000 $339 $325 $292 $151.4
Public Share 70.9% 72.5% 76.8% 94.8%
Private Share 29.1% 27.5% 23.2% 5.2%
Social Welfare -$2,413.8 -$2,421.2 -$2,426.9 -$2,419.9
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Table 4: Nash Equilibrium with Alternative Cost E¤ectiveness of Public Option
 = 0:95  = 1:05
 = 1  10 3  = 10  10 3  = 1  10 3  = 10  10 3
Public Plan
Premium $3,156 $2,734 $3,914 $3,259
Deductible $4 $0 $1 $5
Prot $0 $0 $0 $0
Private Plan
Premium $2,876 $2,403 $3,584 $2,860
Deductible $525 $475 $562 $550
Prot $830 $404 $1,335 $672
Market Share
  1000 $342 $245 $421 $297
Public Share 70.7% 82.9% 62.2% 76.1%
Private Share 29.3% 17.1% 37.8% 23.9%
Social Welfare -$2,418.6 -$2,433.7 -$2,420.5 -$2,448.9
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Table 5: Nash Equilibrium with an Upper Limit on Private InsurersProt Margin
 = 1  10 3  = 2  10 3  = 5  10 3  = 10  10 3
Public Plan
Premium $3,490 $3,362 $3,149 $2,814
Deductible $0 $0 $0 $0
Prot $0 $0 $0 $0
Private Plan
Premium $3,385 $3,253 $3,022 $2,694
Deductible $123 $129 $155 $148
Prot $1,064 $935 $722 $390
Market Share
  1000 $375 $350 $304 $230
Public Share 64.9% 69.8% 75.0% 84.9%
Private Share 33.1% 30.2% 25.0% 15.1%
Social Welfare -$2,415.0 $-2,415.3 -$2,416.5 -$-2,416.9
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Figure 1. Sample from the U.S. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
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Figure 2. Posterior Distribution of Expected Medical Expenditure
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